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A B S T R A C T
States have been widely criticized for failing to advance the international climate regime. Many
observers now believe that a ‘‘new’’ climate governance is emerging through transnational and/or local
forms of action that will eventually plug the resulting governance gaps. Yet states, which remain oddly
absent from most discussions of the ‘‘new’’ governance, will remain key players as governance becomes
more polycentric. This paper introduces a special issue that explores the ability of states to rise to these
interconnected challenges through the analytical prism of policy innovation. It reveals that policy
innovation is much more multi-dimensional than is often thought; it encompasses three vital activities:
invention (centering on the ‘source’ of new policy elements), diffusion (that produces different ‘patterns’
of policy adoption), and the evaluation of the ‘effects’ that such innovations create in reality. The papers,
which range from qualitative case studies to large ‘n’ quantitative studies, offer new insights into the
varied roles that states play in relation to all three.
They show, for instance that: the policy activity of states has risen dramatically in the past decade;
that state innovation is affected to similar degrees by internal and external factors; and that policies that
offer ﬂexibility to target groups on how to meet policy goals are most effective but that voluntary
reporting requirements are ineffective. This paper draws upon these and many other insights to offer a
much more nuanced reﬂection on the future of climate governance; one that deservedly puts states at
the front and center of analysis.
 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/).
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Global Environmental Change
jo ur n al h o mep ag e: www .e lsev ier . co m / loc ate /g lo envc h a1. The ‘‘new’’ governance of climate
Climate change is a wicked problem par excellence (Dryzek,
1987). The policies and institutions that have been designed to
address it should ideally have the capacity to address collective
action problems in a stable and predictable manner, so that
investors can plan with conﬁdence (Young et al., 2006). But they
should also be capable of adapting to new insights into causes and§ This paper is the introduction to a special issue on climate policy innovation. We
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0959-3780/ 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access articunfolding consequences of climate change. In other words, they
should be rigid and ﬂexible at the same time (Jordan and Matt,
2014; Jordan and Huitema, 2014a,b).
If we start with the notion of rigidity, since the 1980s much
hope has been pinned on global collaboration through agreements
such as the Kyoto Protocol. There is an undeniable logic to focusing
effort at this level, as climate change emissions have global effects,
even when they are located in particular jurisdictions and
localities. The global framework for addressing environmental
issues including climate change has rightly been described as ‘‘one
of the big (. . .) stories of the late twentieth century’’ (Jasanoff and
Martello, 2004, p. 3). Suggestions have been made about how to
further strengthen the degree of international collaboration
(Underdal, 2013), through founding a world environmental
organization (Biermann and Bauer, 2005) and removing some of
the obstacles to deeper cooperation (Harris, 2013). But since the
Copenhagen summit in 2009, where no substantive agreement
was reached, the hopes for signiﬁcantly greater governance at this
level have receded. If – as many suspect – international climate
governance has now reached an impasse, the question arises as tole under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/).
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‘‘governance gaps’’ (Abbott, 2013) by innovating, that is by
inventing new policies, by helping them diffuse around the globe,
and by making sure they have a signiﬁcant impact?
To suggest, as many have, that the world needs new and possibly
more innovative forms of governance tells us little about where they
will come from, how they will spread and whether or not they (will)
have inﬂuential effects – the weighty issues that we engage with in
this special issue. International scholars have mostly contributed to
these debates by exploring ways to exploit cracks that have
appeared in the international regime (Keohane and Victor, 2011).
Others have found it more helpful to think in terms of the potential
role of transnational forms of governance (Bulkeley et al., 2014),
which cut across traditional jurisdictional boundaries and are much
less reliant on state steering. Many of these analyses are distinctly
pessimistic about state-led activity (see e.g. Harris, 2013), which is
entirely understandable given that intransigence shown by a
number of big states has done more than anything else to thwart
deeper international cooperation. Hence the new forms of governing
which are discussed are said to operate outside, underneath and
around international fora where nation states meet, such as the
UNFCCC (Bulkeley and Moser, 2007; Okereke et al., 2009), and hence
are multi-scalar. In this rapidly expanding vein of work, we ﬁnd even
more open concepts such as ‘‘climate experiments’’ (Hoffmann,
2011) – which refers to initiatives that are taken by non-state actors,
‘‘polycentric orders’’ (Ostrom, 2009) and ‘‘transnational initiatives’’
(Hale and Roger, 2014) – relating to situations in which independent
actors from different sectors and levels of governance work together,
often via local initiatives that lie beyond the reach of states. This line
of inquiry, which effectively brackets off states from analysis, taps
into the reservoir of misgiving that Jasanoff and Martello (2004)
identiﬁed, when they critiqued the global drive toward one size ﬁts
all policies that have insufﬁcient regard for local context and local
knowledge. It is also attuned to the fashionable notion that
‘‘polycentric governance systems’’ (see e.g. Ostrom, 2005) are
inherently superior to what we could call ‘‘monocentric governance
systems’’ – of which the existence of a single international climate
agreement is perhaps an example.
Evidently, research on the ‘‘new’’ climate governance is advanc-
ing very rapidly, but some of the more apparently novel aspects (e.g.
the transnational) are receiving disproportionate attention. More-
over, positive knowledge claims (governing is occurring outside the
regime) and more normative ones (de-centered governance is an
inherently better way to govern climate change) are often so subtly
interwoven (Lilliestam et al., 2012; Pielke, 2010; Patt, 2010) that it is
difﬁcult for the reader to separate one from the other. The broad
question that we want to explore is what is being lost in the rush to
study new forms of governing ‘‘beyond’’, ‘‘below’’ and ‘‘outside’’ the
state-dominated climate regime? Our argument is that lack of
agreement at the international level and/or dynamism in the
transnational climate domain should not be equated with a
complete disfunctioning or even disappearance of the nation state
– for every state that drags its heels, there is another that wants to go
further, and not every disagreement about means and responsibili-
ties for climate change issues means a complete denial of the
problems. Far from disappearing, national policies, encompassing
national, regional and local government-led initiatives, have always
been an important part of the landscape of climate governance
(Compston and Bailey, 2008; Dubash et al., 2013). In Europe, some of
these policies pre-date the UNFCCC (Harrison and Sundstrom, 2010;
Jordan et al., 2010; Jordan et al., 2012). And ﬁnally, were the
international regime suddenly to spring back into life, national
policies would be needed to implement it. Indeed, the more that
international policy morphs into a ‘‘pledge and review’’ form of
governing, the more governing by the nation state at the national
level will de facto become the international regime.There are commentators who are not just expecting, but urging
states to take on more (Victor, 2010). We sense that Working
Group III of the IPCC (Stavins and Ji, 2014), realized this when, in
Chapter 13, they painted three possible trajectories for future
international policies: ‘‘centralized architectures and strong
multilateralism’’, ‘‘harmonized national policies’’, and ‘‘decentra-
lized approaches with coordinated policies’’. Crucially, in all three,
states are actively involved as policy innovators in their own right
or as facilitators of action by other actors. So, although the state
does not take center stage in the ﬁrst scenario, it would actually be
quite hard to imagine it unfolding without their active involve-
ment as this is in effect a continuation of the current international
regime. In the second scenario, states lead the way – perhaps
organizing the catalytic experiments that many clamor for, and/or
functioning as ‘‘orchestrators’’ (Abbott, 2013; Hale and Roger,
2014). The third scenario is closest to the polycentric ideal as the
Ostroms imagined it; the emphasis would squarely be upon local
jurisdictions taking action, but with an active involvement of
nation states as the guarantors of legitimate decision making and
diffusors of good practices to other (local) settings (see for instance
Ostrom, 2005: 283). So one way or another, states seem destined to
play some role in closing climate gaps. But what roles will these
be?
The existing literature leads us to the following expectations.
First of all – and as conﬁrmed by events since 2008 – states have
access to uniquely important steering capacities (Bell and
Hindmoor, 2009). They are the only actors with the necessary
legitimacy and resources (legal, ﬁnancial) to develop and project
long term visions, stimulate and oversee local approaches, and
carry forward ambitious climate programs. Many scholars of
transnational governance appreciate this – hence the common-
place ﬁnding that so much new governance is emerging in the
shadow of state action (see Hale and Held, 2011; for climate
change adaptation see for instance Bauer and Steurer, 2014), or
that private actors often play a critical role in paving the way for
state action – by pushing issues up the political agenda or critically
evaluating the outcomes of previous policies (see also Auld et al.,
2014). Yet, the focus often remains exclusively on non-state
action.
Second, as well as triggering action in the non- or para-state
sectors, new data conﬁrm that states themselves are innovating by
adopting policies at the national level. The data collected by
Townsend et al. (2013) are highly instructive in this regard, and
show a very rapid rise in the number of new national climate laws
being introduced in the period 1998–2010 (a ﬁvefold increase in
the number of national climate laws adopted, from roughly 5 per
annum in 1998 to about 25 in 2010). Dubash et al. (2013) ﬁnd that
as of 2012, 39% of all countries in the world have a national
mitigation law or strategy, and that 67% of all emissions are
covered by such instruments (up from 23 and 45% in 2007 respec-
tively). This is certainly suggestive of new potential sources of
international governance, because a coalition of the willing
(i.e. relatively more active adopters of national policy) might be
a more solid basis for moving together, if the adoptions can then
be propagated – i.e. diffused – to other parts of the world (compare
Lilliestam et al., 2012).
The idea that state-led action should be brought within the
analytical focus of the new climate governance does beg some
vitally important questions, which we shall address in this special
issue. For example, what might explain the apparent difference
between the level of policy productivity amongst states (see
Lachapelle and Paterson, 2013)? Some states are more hesitant
when it comes to accepting ambitious new climate goals, but
others appear to be more enthusiastic adopters (think of European
states such as Germany or the UK) (for a systematic test, see
Schaffrin et al., 2014). Similarly, dynamics within national policy
Table 1
Three perspectives on innovation (own composition).
Perspective on innovation Key terms
Invention Exploration, novelty, experimentation, tinkering,
discovery, recombination, new to the world
Diffusion Learning, transfer, adoption, exploitation, new to
a particular jurisdiction or agent
Effects Impacts, outcomes, substantial or radical change,
disruption
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to more ambitious climate policies may eventually become
proponents, and vice versa. Insights into how this occurs are still
in development, with some pointing mainly to socio-economic
factors when it comes to the preparedness to act, and institutional
factors when it comes to the types of measures that are taken (see
Lachapelle and Paterson, 2013); others are pointing to the
inﬂuence of jurisdictions – including international organizations
– upon one another (Matisoff and Edwards, 2014; Underdal, 2010).
But more understanding is needed.
Therefore this special issue focuses on innovations in national
climate policy. In this, our introductory article, we present the
guiding ideas, introduce the various contributions, synthesize their
ﬁndings and reﬂect on what they mean for the future of the climate
regime. Section 2 begins by foregrounding the analysis by working
towards a deﬁnition of policy innovation. This proves to be an
important but non-trivial challenge, given how much has been
written on policy and innovation in the past. We therefore develop
a new conceptualization which seeks to draw out the inter-
relationships between three crucial aspects: invention (and the
sources it stems from), diffusion (and the policy-governance
patterns it produces), and (the evaluation of) effects. In Sections 3–
5 we elaborate on each of these three perspectives, suggest which
questions and issues are relevant from each, and discuss what new
insights the various contributions to this special issue have to offer
on them. Section 6 concludes and teases out some important
implications for future research and practice.
2. Policy innovation
If attention to the state requires us to examine national policies and
changes in their goals, means and designs (Jordan and Matt, 2014;
Howlett, 2014, this special issue), how do we recognize ‘‘innovation’’
when we see it? Countless volumes have been written on innovation
(e.g. Rogers, 2003; Fagerberg, 2005). The fact that innovation is such a
cross-disciplinary and normatively appealing concept has, however,
contributed to a fair degree of intellectual fuzziness (Fagerberg,
2005). According to the Oxford Dictionary, innovation can be either a
thing (a noun) or a process (a verb). Hence, innovation can be a product
of innovating – ‘‘a thing newly introduced’’ – or it can relate to theact of
innovating – ‘‘the introduction of a new thing; the alteration of
something established’’. However, as soon as we move beyond these
basic distinctions, a number of large and mostly unresolved
conceptual debates open up (here we borrow from Jordan and
Huitema, 2014a). For instance, how big and how novel does a
particular change have to be to count as an innovation? A distinction is
commonly made between fairly minor improvements and adjust-
ments, and much rarer and more fundamental changes ‘‘[that]
represent clear departures from existing practice’’ (Dewar and Dutton,
1986, p. 1422). Rogers (2003) tries to sidestep this by arguing that an
innovation is ‘‘an idea, practice or object that is perceived as new by an
individual or other unit of adoption’’ (Rogers, 2003, p. 12) (emphasis
added); in other words, innovation is context-speciﬁc. But this begs
the question of which context should be the referent, a point to
which we will return. Also, how should innovation be assessed, if one
wants to go beyond the overly simple view that it is inherently good
(or bad)? In many studies, innovation is so heavily ‘‘laden with
positive value’’ (Downs and Mohr, 1976, p. 700) that its underlying
purposes and eventual effects are either left unexplored or assumed to
be positive (Rogers, 2003, p. 106). In a complex problem area such as
climate change, where many potential policy solutions vie for
attention, this should not be uncritically accepted. In fact, the relative
attractiveness of different processes and outputs is often at the very
center of policy debate.
Rather than close down these issues by forcing the authors to
subscribe to a particular view of innovation, we organize theircontributions by using the three perspectives outlined above:
invention, diffusion, and effects (see Table 1). The term innovation
can thus refer to the novelty of emerging policies, to the extensive
diffusion of such policies, and to their effects.
In the words of Duit and Galaz (2008), the invention perspective
is about the ability of all actors to explore (experiment, play,
discover). Various bodies of literature relate to this issue, often
touching upon similar themes such as diversity and experimenta-
tion. The literature on polycentric governance for instance strongly
warns against relying on one jurisdictional level or organization to
provide the inventive thrust (see Ostrom, 2009). Scholars in this
vein also suggest that in complex adaptive systems such as those
related to climate change, the effects of a new policy can hardly be
predicted and therefore it is better not to rely on a single approach
(Ostrom, 2005). Instead, many actors should experiment with their
own approaches, so that gradually a quasi-experimental system
emerges, from which at some point best practices can be selected.
In the policy sciences, the work of policy entrepreneurs (or related
terms such as political entrepreneurs, policy champions, and policy
constituencies) is receiving more attention (Kingdon, 1984;
Huitema and Meijerink, 2009). They are potentially the missing
link between experiments – that provide proof of principle – and
catalytic impacts.
Various comments can be made about the study of inventions.
The ﬁrst is that invention and inventiveness has a very strong
normative appeal but innovation scholars have become increas-
ingly aware they should avoid a bias toward novelty as invention in
itself does not always necessarily lead to improvement (Fagerberg,
2005). Secondly, policy invention typically tends to be studied on
the basis of single case studies extending over a long time frame.
Recent work that seeks to understand the invention of emissions
trading (Voß and Simons, 2014) or feed in tariffs (Jacobs, 2014) ﬁts
into this categorization. And ﬁnally, in studies of invention (for
instance from the perspective of transitions management), the
state tends to be pushed into the analytical background and in
some cases is ignored all together (see Huitema and Meijerink,
2009). Yet Ostrom (2009) conﬁrms that nation states have an
important role in ensuring that new policies satisfy democratic
criteria, and in scaling up best practices, a point which is also found
(but not fully developed) in the literature on transitions (see e.g.
Geels, 2002).
The second row of Table 1 – diffusion – refers to an
interpretation of policy innovation that emphasizes the spreading
of novel approaches. In this understanding, new approaches are
only innovative if and when they enter into widespread use i.e., are
adopted by or diffused to many jurisdictions. This perspective does
not attach much value to absolute (worldwide) novelty, but
instead suggests that what matters most is how many extra
jurisdictions adopt a policy for the ﬁrst time, regardless of its
absolute novelty (Walker, 1969; Downs and Mohr, 1979). This
interpretation connects to the notion of exploitation as deﬁned by
Duit and Galaz (2008), which the associate with terms such as
reﬁnement, efﬁciency, selection, implementation, and execution.
Policy diffusion is a very mature ﬁeld of academic enquiry, with
many conceptual frameworks to choose from (see for a summary
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question often driving the analysis is why countries adopt policies,
which could be for reasons are external to the state, but also for
reasons that are internal to it, or a combination (see Jordan and
Huitema, 2014a,b). Less fully investigated are, ﬁrst of all, the
attributes of the policies that diffuse, such as their complexity, the
visibility of the issue they are addressing, etc. (see for instance
Makse and Volden, 2009; Busch and Jo¨rgens, 2012 – and compare
Howlett, 2014). Until recently, policies and their internal
elements were treated as invariant, treating instruments essen-
tially as tools from a kit. More recently, greater attention has been
paid to the fact that policies that diffuse might have a stable core
(Jacobs, 2014), but also differ in many subtle ways from country to
country (Voß and Simons, 2014), for instance because of post
adoption dynamics – which can in some cases undo any real
policy impact.
Finally, the ﬁnal row of Table 1 refers to effects, i.e. what is
actually achieved by the introduction of new policies? Although (or
perhaps because) innovation is a term replete with positive
connotations, it acknowledges the possibility that what is sold as
innovative does not actually create much impact, or no lasting
impact or possibly even deleterious impacts. In this perspective,
the label ‘‘innovative’’ is reserved for those policies that actually
cut emissions (mitigation) and/or make human communities safer
from the effects of climate change (adaptation). In this vein, Polsby
(1984, p. 8) suggested that the acid test of a policy innovation is one
that alters (or promises to alter) the lives of people in ‘‘substantial
and fairly permanent ways’’. Policy evaluation is an important and
growing ﬁeld of study, but unlike the literature on diffusion, there
is no dominant theory or approach (Christie, 2003). This because
the core of any evaluation is judgment, that is the comparison of
what is actually achieved (or will be achieved if the evaluation is
done ex ante) with a certain norm. Evaluation criteria differ, but
popular ones include goal achievement and effectiveness, cost
effectiveness and efﬁciency, coordination, and fairness, legal
acceptability and transparency (Huitema et al., 2011). In addition,
there is a wide gap between the theoretical-conceptual consensus
about the importance of ex post evaluation, real world practice:
much evaluation activity is non-reﬂexive and non-participatory
(Huitema et al., 2011). Finally, the climate policy evaluation
literature is relatively silent on the extent to which policy makers
actually use the outcomes of evaluations in their policy invention
processes (for an exception see Hilde´n (2014)).
Before moving to discuss the ﬁndings of the papers, it is
important to note that Table 1 reveals that the criterion for what
counts as innovative is different for each of these understandings.
The term invention is normally restricted to the development of
something that is entirely new – i.e. not used anywhere else in the
world before (Rogers, 2003). The reference point or context in this
case is global. Diffusion refers to the process through which these
inventions circulate and possibly enter into common use, via
processes of learning, transfer, and adoption. In this perspective,
the reference point is the adopting unit or actor: ‘‘new’’ means new
to the adopting agent, and not necessarily to the world in general
(Downs and Mohr, 1979). Finally, to count as an innovation, some
have argued that it should not only be new or widely adopted; it
must also do something, namely substantively change the world,
particularly in a radical and disruptive manner (Fagerberg, 2005).
3. Sources: the invention of new policies
The contributions to this special issue focus quite profoundly on
the political aspect of policy invention – suggesting that innovation
is often disruptive of established interests, therefore inherently
risky for politicians to endorse. However, innovation can nonethe-
less be accomplished via complex processes where various types ofpolicy entrepreneurs collaborate with bureaucrats and politicians
to push their solutions. Howlett’s contribution (2014) is deeply
inﬂuenced by the North-American experience with climate policy.
It is also extremely helpful in opening up the ‘‘black box’’ of the
state to uncover some of the micro-foundations of political
behavior that are glossed over in many current governance accounts.
It points to the elements that are contained in the risk calculus that
elected politicians make; these include issues such as the visibility of
the problem (which may be obvious to experts but far less so the
general public) and the avoidability of blame (for climate events that
lead to damages). His conclusion is very sobering: climate policy
innovations will remain not only rare, but mostly negative or
symbolic. Politicians will either take only symbolic action, including
initiating small scale experiments, or resort to denying the problem
and denigrating opponents. On this basis, he predicts relatively few
climate policy innovations for now (the political calculus may
change in the future, when climate impacts become more evident).
This prediction obviously clashes somewhat with the high numbers
of newly adopted laws and plans reported in Section 1, but then
again the data by Dubash et al. (2013) suggest that various parts of
the world are innovating at different moments of time (with the
current center of activity being in Asia), and North America may
actually simply join the party later.
We should add that it also is quite clear that politicians are
deﬁnitely not the only actors involved in policy invention. In fact
their role comes relatively late in the invention process, whereas
earlier stages are dominated by actors from outside the state
(businesses, academics, NGOs, international organizations) and by
the national bureaucracy (the other key actor within the state). In
their contribution on the way the EU introduced a novel ﬁnancing
mechanism to support Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) and
renewable energy (the so called NER 300 fund), Boasson and
Wettestad (2014) focus on precisely these actors. Their analysis
suggests that policy invention emerges from both slow and fast
processes – involving what they call ‘‘tortoise’’ and ‘‘carpe diem’’
types of policy entrepreneurs. The tortoises – mainly existing of
bureaucrats, NGOs and industry actors in this case – do the
preparatory work. The carpe diem entrepreneurs – mainly highly
placed politicians – associate themselves with the initiatives in a
much more ad hoc fashion – for instance because they want to leave
their mark on decision making. The work of carpe diem entrepre-
neurs aims to ﬁnd winning coalitions, and this inevitably requires a
certain level of power play and horse-trading. The speed at which
windows of opportunity and potential solutions draw the attention
of politicians, who can subsequently move on again, is perhaps
bafﬂing, but it is also a hopeful dynamic as risk averseness –
something which Howlett regard as being hard wired into
politicians – may not always dominate in every situation, and
may even be turned to positive use by policy entrepreneurs. The
interesting ﬁnding by Biesenbender and Tosun (2014) that novel
climate policies are usually introduced in the second half of political
terms of ofﬁce, lends some credibility to the importance of this
dynamic. In addition, it would seem that politicians do like to engage
in forms of political risk management, for example by emulating and
learning from tried and tested foreign experiences. These are often
sold to them as readymade solutions by what Voß and Simons (2014)
have called ‘‘instrument constituencies’’. The notion of carpe diem
entrepreneurship on the other hand does seem to jar more forcefully
with the predictions made by Howlett (2014), and thus warrants
further work. One obvious issue to explore is the extent to which
politicians operating at different levels (in this case in the European
Parliament and nationally) and answering to different political
constituencies, support and/or undermine one another (Jordan et al.,
2012). Another is to study whether short term political commitment
to particular policies ever translates into longer term involvement
and support, or is only ever episodic.
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The three contributions to this special issue that focus on policy
diffusion all take a large n, quantitative approach, and help us to
make much greater sense of the underlying reasons why so many
countries from the Global South and North, have adopted new
climate policies in recent years. Massey et al. (2014) for instance
ﬁnd a 635% increase in the adoption rate of novel adaptation
policies in Europe in the period 2005–2010. Stadelmann and
Castro (2014), on the basis of their analysis of renewable energy
policies in the global South, suggest that internal drivers are of
greater inﬂuence in the diffusion process – and that especially a
lack of energy security, lower levels of GDP, and the democratic
nature of national government are correlated with policy
diffusion. Massey et al. (2014) however ﬁnd that external
drivers are more prominent in the diffusion of adaptation
policies across Europe. The dominant pattern is that the
occurrence of extreme weather events coupled with research
predicting that these are likely to increase in frequency, severity
and cost in the future, motivate states – and especially the richer
ones – to adopt adaptation policies. For the lower and middle
income countries, however, the role played by scientiﬁc research
is less important; for these countries pressure from EU bodies
are more important, much more so than for the higher income
countries. A lack of resources, state capacity, and political
awareness rank (in order) as the top three barriers across all
countries, but especially the lower income states. The ﬁndings of
Massey et al. (2014) are consistent with those of Biesenbender
and Tosun (2014), who suggest that the adoption of climate
policies in the OECD countries is inﬂuenced by learning from
international organizations, which is an external driver. Their
ﬁndings also suggest that countries that depend on inward
investment are far more careful in adopting climate policies
than countries that do not (ibid.).
Regarding the learning process that take place within states, a
consistent ﬁnding across all the papers is that something that has
worked in a jurisdiction that policy makers feel culturally close to
has a much higher chance of being adopted. This ‘‘dynamic of
afﬁnity’’ between jurisdictions is alluded to by both Biesenbender
and Tosun (2014) and Stadelmann and Castro (2014). Matisoff and
Edwards (2014), in their analysis of renewable energy policy
diffusion amongst US states, ﬁnd the same phenomenon.
Furthermore they add that each ‘‘cultural block’’ of states tends
to have a leading state that the others look to for guidance (these
include Texas, California and New York). These leader states have
higher levels of resources and tend to be more inventive in
introducing novel policies. Other jurisdictions tend to follow
leader states that have similar preferences in terms of instru-
ments and the types of technology favored (e.g. solar versus wind
power, ibid.). In a similar vein, Stadelmann and Castro (2014)
point to the fact that countries may indeed adopt new policies,
but that these might not be the same. They ﬁnd that GDP
inﬂuences the types of instrument chosen with higher levels of
GDP positively correlated with the adoption of feed-in tariffs and
ﬁnancial instruments.
The contributions also shed light on the patterns of policy
adoption and diffusion and their subsequent consequences.
Biesenbender and Tosun (2014) suggest that more attention
should be paid to the fact that after adoption, countries tend to
modify policies again, a point consistent with observations made
by Jacobs (2014). Their interesting observation is that the adoption
of policies is dominated by learning (from international organiza-
tions), whereas the later modiﬁcation is affected more by
emulation from policy practices adopted by (again) culturally
and politically similar peer countries. Moreover, this post adoption
modiﬁcation process – they argue – tends to be dominated bynational interest groups exerting downward pressure on standards.
In addition, they argue that countries try to avoid moving beyond
internationally agreed standards (i.e. a post adoption version of the
classic race to the top); rather, they respond to domestic pressure
from national interest groups by pulling back from an international
norm after it has been adopted, thereby conﬁrming the need for ex
post evaluation. The priorities of political parties matter as well, as
the propensity to adopt climate policies is greater when green
parties have a stronger representation.
5. Effects: the evaluation of policy innovations
In this special issue, the paper by Auld et al. (2014) bears the
most directly on the issue of evaluation (but compare Hilde´n et al.,
2014). They performed a systematic review of 165 ex post
evaluation studies that assessed policies aimed at the development
and use of low carbon technologies. These studies together
evaluated a total of 292 climate policies worldwide – instigated,
it should be said, both by public and by private actors (i.e. spanning
the worlds of state led and transnational governance). An
interesting ﬁnding is that the process of agenda setting appears
to make little difference in terms of positive or negative evaluation
outcomes, although there are certain indications that some factors
are more signiﬁcant predictors of favorable policy evaluations,
notably a favorable public opinion (mentioned for 11 policies), the
presence of policy entrepreneurs (for 19 policies – c.f. the paper by
Boasson and Wettestad, 2014), supportive international processes
(15 policies – c.f. Biesenbender and Tosun, 2014), and the
occurrence of focusing events (mentioned for 13 policies – c.f.
Massey et al., 2014). Their article also contains strong evidence that
the importance of ﬂexibility matters in policy design. This refers to
the need to set goals, but to leave target groups the choice of the
means and technologies to achieve such goals; such ﬂexibility is
achieved by certain forms of regulation and by economic
instruments that work on the basis of ﬁnancial incentives. This
observation bodes well for rapidly spreading policy instruments
such as emissions trading and environmental taxation (but not
necessarily for all jurisdictions though – see above), but also calls
attention to the fact that regulation need not always be ‘‘command
and control’’ and can actually be associated with quite a few
positive evaluations. Auld et al. uncover a dilemma in the sense
that policies also need to be timed correctly – their settings should
not be ﬁxed for too long, but they should also not be changed
continuously – which brings us back to the balance between
rigidity and ﬂexibility that we started this paper with. More
dilemmas are posed by hybrid instruments (where public and
private authorities are both used) and by voluntary reporting
mechanisms (which are efﬁcient but associated with less positive
evaluations for effectiveness and legitimacy). And to these Haug
et al. (2010) add that these dilemmas associated with the use of
economic instruments (tradable permit schemes, taxes) has
regressive effects, which means that effectiveness and equity
concerns also might need to be balanced.
The paper by Massey et al. (2014) assesses the ‘‘depth’’ and
longevity of policy activity that emerges from innovation
processes. They do so by relying upon measuring the extent to
which ongoing policy innovation produces a new ‘‘policy ﬁeld’’.
Their assumption is that this may provide a better measure of
deeper institutionalization on the grounds that policy ﬁelds are
more difﬁcult to dismantle once they have been formed than single
policies (thereby creating greater rigidity it seems). They measure
inter alia the number of sectors addressed by the policy and the
number of oversight bodies. They conclude that an emerging policy
ﬁeld is only apparent in ﬁve of the 29 European countries that they
have analyzed; a ﬁnding which suggests that policy innovation has
not yet produced enduring policy effects.
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We have argued that climate policy activity by nation states is
currently not sufﬁciently accounted for in practices and analyses
of the ‘‘new’’ climate governance. In fact, many analysts appear to
have either forgotten about or quietly given up on the nation state,
having pinned their hopes on other actors (civil society,
companies, NGOs) to ﬁll the glaring governance gaps that have
become even more apparent since the 2009 Copenhagen confer-
ence. These gaps require a signiﬁcant alteration of the status quo
and history teaches us that one means of achieving this is through
the introduction of new and more effective policies, i.e. policy
innovation. And contrary to the popular image of states as
unwilling and inactive actors, states are in fact stepping up to
meet this challenge. The data presented by Townsend et al.
(2013) and others show a very rapid rise in national policy
activity in the realm of mitigation; if we compare these with the
numbers mentioned by Massey et al. (2014), it would seem that
the activity levels in relation to adaptation policy might even be
greater.
Even if this policy activity is not divided evenly over the various
parts of the world (see Dubash et al., 2013), it does suggest that
there might be genuine prospects for diffusion of effective
policies to other places. To judge the prospects for this we
obviously need to understand the dynamics underpinning the
arrival of new policy approaches (invention), the factors that
inﬂuence the spread of such policies (diffusion) and garner
insights from the evaluation literature on what works in
particular settings (effects). Reﬂecting upon the approach we
have taken in this special issue, we suggest that the combination
of three different perspectives on innovation is a fertile way of
examining current developments in climate governance. With-
out invention there is little to diffuse, without diffusion any
improvement by a sufﬁcient number of countries will remain
elusive, and without evaluation one cannot know what kinds of
policy innovations to aim for. Therefore deeper understanding of
each of these aspects is needed before we can fully appreciate
the current dynamic of the ‘‘new’’ climate governance. In the
remainder of this section we discuss the implications of the
ﬁndings of the papers for the future of climate governance, and
present suggestions for fresh research.
Regarding the implications for the future prospects of the
global climate regime, here we followed the IPCC report
(speciﬁcally Stavins and Ji, 2014), which has suggested that
three alternative scenarios could help us explore the various
options: centralized architectures and strong multilateralism,
harmonized national policies, and decentralized approaches
with coordinated policies. We conﬁrmed that the state is a key
actor in all of these scenarios; it therefore matters greatly
whether, how and in what directions states innovate their
policies. It is of course easy to be skeptical about the role and
activities of nation states on the basis of the contributions to this
special issue. What if politicians continue to be so risk averse
that they only act if they really must? And what if the diffusion of
policies mainly hinges on external drivers, especially active
global negotiations which are clearly faltering? There are quite a
few signs that global gatherings provide windows of opportunity
for countries who want to inﬂuence others; but what if that were
to fall away completely because of the current disappointment
with what is being achieved? And what if countries persist with
instruments that are apparently associated with less positive
evaluations – such as voluntary reporting mechanisms, which
are relatively efﬁcient, but less effective? Without some form of
binding agreement at a higher jurisdictional level it would
probably be a lot easier to revert back to policy making that is
relatively symbolic.But a much more optimistic reading of the ﬁndings presented in
this special issue is also possible. We encountered evidence that:
1. Politicians may be risk averse in general, but can be quickly
motivated by inventive constituencies and entrepreneurs to
change position and thus seize the opportunities offered by
proposals of more persistent and possibly;
2. Internal drivers are actually important in adopting climate
policies – including higher levels of GDP, greater levels of
democracy, and a more frequent occurrence of focusing events –
factors that are materializing in many countries;
3. The selection of policy instruments will be in line with the
insights offered by evaluation studies – notably that they should
offer more ﬂexibility (rules that set goals and not instrument;
taxes and tradable permit schemes that incentivize technologi-
cal progress). Here too, current practice seems to be moving in
this direction.
4. International cooperation is still possible, even if the global
regime completely collapses. The prominence of the factor of
afﬁnity between certain states, that is, states that have a similar
cultural or policy tradition, in explaining policy diffusion is a
very interesting ﬁnding that has not been given much thought
yet in debates on climate policy. Obviously, not much is known
about what could be the determinants of such afﬁnity (except
apparently a shared colonial past – see Stadelmann and Castro,
2014), and which countries would have afﬁnity with whom, but
it could lead to novel collaborations between blocs of states (see
Matisoff and Edwards, 2014). This scenario would offer a means
to engage in natural policy experiments to test different ways of
responding to climate change.
In terms of new research questions that have emerged, we ﬁrst
of all like to refer to Howlett’s (2014) argument that innovation can
occur both in terms of policy goals and means. As climate policy is a
domain that is suffused with good intentions, the fact that the
papers were largely concerned with the rather technical aspects of
the means (policy means) as opposed to lofty goals and strategies
should be welcomed. At the same time, we started out with the
suggestion that global social-ecological systems related to climate
are complex and unpredictable (the changing climate in our title).
This means that ﬂexibility in terms of goal setting is required too.
However, because of the orientation of the contributions to our
special issue, we gained little in terms of understanding the
intricacies involved in that. Can we assume that setting more
stringent climate goals is also politically risky and that therefore
the same dynamics apply as for the introduction of new
instruments? Or should we assume that the setting of goals is a
process that is somehow disconnected from actual implementa-
tion, and that therefore innovations in goal setting are more easily
achieved? The contributions contain some interesting observa-
tions that could serve as a starting point for further research here.
Auld et al. (2014) for instance observe that a certain level of rigidity
in the goals of policy is necessary because otherwise societal actors
lack a stable point of reference. How to combine the obvious needs
for both rigidity and ﬂexibility is a very important research
question, which certainly also has a legal dimension. Under many
current government policies permissions (in the form of licenses to
emit, etc.) are often interpreted as eternal rights which cannot be
revoked without compensation.
A second issue is the relative importance of the various
jurisdictional levels implied in climate policy processes. The
articles in this special all engaged with public policy at the national
level centering on states and their emanations) and therefore did
not explicitly focus on other levels (the subnational, the
international), except in the role of drivers or barriers to novel
national policies. It is remarkable, however, how little subnational
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here, certainly when one compares this with the prominent
inﬂuence of the international level – as a provider of models, as a
creator of windows of opportunity. Although this observation is in
line with the suggestion made in this journal by Howlett and Joshi-
Koop (2011), based on their analysis of Canadian environmental
policy, that subnational policy makers are hardly connected to
international fora or on their colleagues in other countries, it is
certainly not in line with a central tenet of the transnational
climate policy literature which points to the role of international
networks of progressive local governments and cities in agenda
setting and mutual policy learning (see for instance Kern and
Bulkeley, 2009). One question to ask is whether this dynamic is
signiﬁcant but was simply missed by our contributing authors, or
whether it is actually not as signiﬁcant as is often claimed. And if it
is signiﬁcant, does this mean that nation states and their
subnational emanations all have their own discrete networks,
each tightly organized around their task portfolios, without much
regard for exchange and lesson drawing between them? But if this
is true can the greatly hyped catalytic effects of climate policy
innovation by subnational state actors ever really materialize in
such circumstances? A different but somewhat different question,
moving back the focus to the nation state: if inter-state diffusion is
needed to get things moving in the absence of global agreement,
how much time is it likely to require? The behavioral model
invoked by diffusion research is one of the slow learning and
gradual mimicking, not non-incremental bursts of policy innova-
tion. In view of this, should we assume it will be faster and more
productive than negotiating common standards through often
agonizingly slow international processes? Here knowledge on the
effect of policy characteristics on the speed of their diffusion might
be worth pursuing further (see Busch and Jo¨rgens, 2012), with the
oft claimed differences between adaptation and mitigation
carefully tested for.
Third and related to that, except the impact of the oil and gas
industry on the EU’s NER 300 fund (Boasson and Wettestad,
2014) and a moderate proportion of (apparently less effective)
measures covered by the systematic review of Auld et al. (2014)
there is little in this special issue that points to an important
constructive role of market parties in stimulating climate policy
innovations at the national level. Instead, there are several
indications, especially by Biesenbender and Tosun (2014) that
over time a heavy reliance on inward investment (and hence a
threat from economic actors of an investment strike), exerts a
strong downward pressure on policies that have been agreed upon
internationally. And on the basis of Auld et al. (2014) we should
also add that policy instruments which are popular in the private
sector such as voluntary reporting requirements, are not
associated with high degrees of effectiveness. Interesting ques-
tions on how state measures interact with private initiatives such
certiﬁcation schemes and carbon labeling have largely remained
unaddressed in this special issue although we suspect that they do
have a bearing upon each other. More research is needed on
whether these complement one another or not. For those who are
aware of the legitimacy challenges that private initiatives face
(Bulkeley and Jordan, 2012), an interesting question could be
whether state involvement in such initiatives would address them
or not.
Fourth, what is the effect of policy diffusion and of newly
introduced policies? Post adoption dynamics have, for the ﬁrst
time, received serious attention in this special issue, but certainly
not enough. Boasson and Wettestad (2014) gave us a hopeful
message about the existence of ‘‘carpe diem’’ entrepreneurs,
mainly politicians who help to adopt new policy initiatives. But do
such innovations have any real lasting meaning, or can they
quickly be amended and could eventually be totally dismantled(see for a discussion of symbolic, or ‘‘frame based innovations’’,
Upham et al., 2014)? Massey et al. (2014) assume that the
emergence of a new policy ﬁeld (which apparently is occurring in
several European countries in relation to climate adaptation)
would make such reversals more difﬁcult, but is that really true?
And probably the most important question of all is what do new
policies actually accomplish in terms of addressing the problems
they purport to address? Here, additional questions can be asked at
the intersection between invention and evaluation: are more
innovative policy systems also necessarily better performers in an
ecological sense?
We ﬁnish this introduction by reiterating that all actors in the
new climate governance (civil society, business, subnational
actors, nation states, UNFCCC) need to be studied and understood,
before we leap to conclusions, and certainly before we write off any
single actor such as the nation state. In fact, in all scenarios
discussed by the IPCC, the state matters greatly. If states – acting
through national policy arenas – decide to step into the governance
gap, the contributors to this collection identify a number of tasks
that they might come under political pressure to discharge. These
include the challenge of setting more ambitious goals and choosing
means that are novel in the national context (Howlett, 2014),
stimulating and supporting the work of policy entrepreneurs
(Boasson and Wettestad, 2014), supporting other jurisdictions
with less resources in adopting effective new approaches to
adaptation (Massey et al., 2014), managing downward pressure on
policy goals that were accepted in an international setting
(Biesenbender and Tosun, 2014), maintaining links and an
exchange of ideas between countries with similar governance
traditions (Stadelmann and Castro, 2014), and encouraging policy
learning by building up new evaluation capacities (Auld et al.,
2014). Even if such tasks are daunting and are certainly not always
picked up by states with the fervor we would hope for, ignoring the
nation state altogether does not help the debate move forward,
hence our call for great attention to national policy innovation.
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